Washington's Sexually Violent Predators
Statute: Law or Lottery? A Response to
Professor Brooks
John Q. La Fond*
When I recommended my friend, Alex Brooks, as a contributor to this special symposium issue on Washington's new
sexually violent predator commitment law,' I was confident
that Alex, with his keen intellect and extensive experience as
pioneer teacher and scholar in the mental health field, would
write an article that would stimulate both intense debate and
careful reflection on this unique law.2 I was not disappointed.
His article sets forth a provocative analysis and defense of this
controversial legislation.3
Because I believe that scholarly debate is extremely
important to a thorough consideration of this law from multi4
ple perspectives and because, as an opponent of the statute, I
have come to conclusions that differ fundamentally from those
set forth by my friend, I would like to exercise what might be
called the "home field advantage" and respond briefly to his
article. I should add, of course, that, though I disagree with
Alex, his article is a most welcome contribution to this symposium and to a full understanding of this law. Though my comments will be sharply contrary to his views, the enormous
affection and respect I have for him remain as strong as
always.
* Professor of Law, University of Puget Sound.
University.
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The author wishes to acknowledge the insightful comments of Professor

Richard Singer and Robert Boruchowitz.
1. WASH. REV. CODE ch. 71.09 (Supp. 1990-91). For a thorough description of this
statute, see Brian G. Bodine, Washington's New Violent Sexual PredatorCommitment

System: An UnconstitutionalLaw and an Unwise Policy Choice, 14 U. PUGET SOUND
L. REV. 105 (1990).

2. Professor Brooks is the Joseph Weintraub Professor of Law Emeritus at the
Rutgers Law School, Newark, and Associate, Institute for Health, Health Care Policy,
and Aging Research, Rutgers University.
3. See Alexander D. Brooks, The Constitutionality and Morality of Civilly
Committing Violent Sexual Predators,15 U. PUGET SOUND L. REv. 709 (1992).

4. I wrote the Amicus Curiae Brief for the American Civil Liberties Union of
Washington attacking the constitutionality of the statute.
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CONCEPTUALIZING THE STATUTE PROPERLY

To analyze Washington's sexually violent predator commitment law, it is essential that one accurately conceptualize
the law. Unfortunately, Professor Brooks does not conceptualize the statute accurately. At various points in his article, he
seemingly defends that law as a legitimate exercise of the
state's power of preventive detention, civil commitment, and
criminal punishment. Because the law authorizes the government to take away an individual's liberty, possibly for life, the
clear burden is on the state to establish its authority under a
system of confinement that is legally recognized in our constitutional system.5 To withstand constitutional scrutiny, the
statute must, therefore, be sustained as a legitimate exercise of
one--and only one-of these powers.' In my view, it cannot be
sustained under any of these theories of state power.
A.

Preventive Detention

While opponents of the statute have attacked it as an
unconstitutional exercise of indeterminate detention to prevent crime,7 Professor Brooks argues that the statute should
not be considered an exercise of "pure" preventive detention
because it is "crime-related."' He writes:
The preventive detention of the SVP statute is not "pure"
because the statute applies only to those offenders who have
already been convicted of at least one crime of sexual violence, and usually more than one. Thus, preventive detention of this statute is crime-related. A person who is
sexually deviant cannot be committed as a sexually violent
predator, regardless of the evidence of his sexually behavior,
of a crime of sexual violence
if he has never been convicted
9
as defined in the statute.
5. Salerno v. United States, 481 U.S. 739 (1987); Foucha v. Louisiana, 112 S. Ct.
1780 (1992).
6. These systems of control are mutually exclusive. The government must justify
its authority to confine an individual in specific institutions for specific purposes. See

Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1781-89 (White, J.).
7. Amicus Curiae Brief of the American Civil Liberties Union of Washington, In

re Young (Wash. filed Feb. 4, 1991) (No. 57837-1) [hereinafter ACLU Brief].
8. Brooks, supra note 3, at 717.
9. Id at 717. Professor Brooks is not precisely accurate. Under the statute a
person found incompetent to stand trial or not guilty by reason of insanity can be
committed indefinitely at the expiration of his criminal commitment. WASH. REV.

CODE §§ 71.09.030(3)-(4) (Supp. 1990-91). Thus, the state need not convict an individual
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But this misstates the issue. Preventive detention,
whether or not denominated as "pure," does not turn on
whether the person to be confined has previously committed a
criminal offense. Rather, it depends on whether the government must prove anything more than "dangerousness" to
secure an individual's confinement." And, as it happens, the
most recent cases in which the United States Supreme Court
considered whether the government could constitutionally
exercise its power of pure preventive detention involved legislation that confined only those who were charged with a serious crime or had actually committed a criminal act."
In Salerno v. United States,' 2 the government had to
obtain an indictment or information charging a serious federal
crime before it could seek pretrial preventive detention of an
individual to prevent him from committing other serious
crimes pending his criminal trial. The government did not
have to prove Salerno suffered from a mental illness or disorder that caused him to be dangerous. It did, however, have to
prove probable cause that the criminal defendant had committed a serious offense and that, within the time provided for by
the federal Speedy Trial Act,' 3 it intended to convict him for
that past offense. The court in Salerno thus upheld as constitutional the federal Bail Reform Act' 4 that authorized pure
preventive detention that was "crime-related."' 5
In the more recent case of Foucha v. Louisiana, 6 the
to commit him, though it must prove he committed a criminal act that would have
constituted the actus reus of a qualifying sex crime under the statute.
10. Statutes that authorize preventive detention limit the class of individuals who
might be subjected to preventive detention and the circumstances under which the
government may seek preventive detention. The government must also prove those
facts when it seeks to confine someone solely to prevent them from committing
crimes. See, e.g., Salerno v. United States, 481 U.S. 739 (1987). The basic point is that,
under its power of preventive detention, the government does not have to prove an
individual has committed a crime that would justify his confinement for a punitive
purpose nor must it prove that an individual suffers from a mental illness that renders
him likely to commit a harmful act and would justify his confinement for care and
control.
11. For a brief description of all Supreme Court cases involving preventive
detention, see John Q. La Fond, Washington's Sexually Violent Predator Law: A
DeliberateMisuse of the Therapeutic State for Social Control, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L.
REV. 655, 688 n. 126 (1992).
12. 481 U.S. 739 (1987). For a more thorough discussion of Salerno's applicability
to the statute, see La Fond, supra note 11, at 689-90, and ACLU Brief, supra note 7.
13. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
14. Id. §§ 141-3156.
15. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745-52.
16. 112 S.Ct. 1780 (1992). For a more thorough discussion of how the Foucha case
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Supreme Court rejected Louisiana's argument that the state
could exercise its power of pure preventive detention to continue to confine indefinitely an individual found not guilty by
reason of insanity who was considered dangerous but no longer
mentally ill. Justice White acknowledged in Foucha that preventive detention was constitutionally acceptable under limited
conditions. He said: "We have also held that in certain narrow
circumstances persons who pose a danger to others or to the
community may be subject to limited confinement ... ,,17 In
rejecting Louisiana's argument that it could indefinitely confine someone who was not mentally ill but was considered dangerous, Justice White said:
Salerno, unlike this case, involved pretrial detention. We
observed in Salerno that the "government's interest in
preventing crime by arrestees is both legitimate and compelling," and that the statute involved there was a constitutional implementation of that interest. The statute carefully
limited the circumstances under which detention could be
sought to those involving the most serious crimes (crimes of
violence, offenses punishable by life imprisonment or death,
serious drug offense, or certain repeat offenders), and was
narrowly focused on a particularly acute problem in which
the government interests are overwhelming. In addition to
first demonstrating probable cause, the government was
required, in a "full-blown adversary hearing," to convince a
neutral decisionmaker by clear and convincing evidence that
no conditions of release can reasonably assure the safety of
the community or any person ....

Furthermore, the dura-

tion of confinement under the Act was strictly limited. The
arrestee was entitled to a prompt detention hearing and the
maximum length of pretrial detention was limited by the
"stringent time limitations of the Speedy Trial Act." If the
arrestee was convicted, he would be confined as a criminal
proved guilty; if he were acquitted, he would go free.' 8
The Washington statute is not limited to pretrial detainees or
to the most serious crimes. 19 Moreover, the government need
applies to the Washington law, see James Ellis, Limits on the State's Power to Confine
"Dangerous" Persons: Constitutional Implications of Foucha v. Louisiana, 15 U.
PUGET SOUND L. REv. 635 (1992); La Fond, supra note 11, at 692-95; Supplemental
Brief of the American Civil Liberties Union of Washington, In re Young (Wash. filed
June 10, 1992) (No. 57837-1) [hereinafter ACLU Supplemental Brief].
17. Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1786.
18. Id. (citing Salerno, 481 U.S. at 747-51) (emphasis added).
19. A crucial factor under the statute is the status of the victim, not the crime.

1992]

A Response to ProfessorBrooks

759

not establish probable cause that would itself provide evidence
of recent dangerous behavior. Nor must it show that other
steps would not reasonably assure community safety. Most
importantly, the statute does not limit the duration of confinement. Unlike the federal Speedy Trial Act2' and similar to
Foucha's provision, commitment under the statute may be forever. And, of course, there will be no trial on pending criminal
charges, so there can be no acquittal and release.
Foucha forecloses any claim that the statute is a constitutionally permissible exercise of the state's preventive detention
authority. Not even the dissenting opinions in Foucha
attempted to uphold the continued confinement of Foucha as a
lawful exercise of preventive detention.
The Foucha case is particularly applicable to the Washington law because the verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity
at the trial clearly established that Foucha had committed a
criminal act. Indeed, it may also have established that he had
acted with a criminal state of mind, but, because mental illness
had rendered him unable to know that his act was wrong, he
could not be punished. 2 ' Thus, Louisiana argued that though it
could not confine him as punishment for commission of a past
crime and was not asserting its power of involuntary commitment of the mentally ill, the state could exercise its power of
pure preventive detention to confine Foucha indefinitely to
prevent him from committing another crime even though he
was not mentally ill. Put differently, the state argued it only
had to prove Foucha was dangerous. The Court rejected this
claim even though Louisiana had argued its power of preventive detention was "crime-related."
Professor Brooks is inaccurate when he limits the state's
power of pure preventive detention as applying only to those
individuals who have not committed a crime or, in his words,
as being "crime-related."2 2 In Salerno, the state had established probable cause to believe Salerno had committed a serious crime in the past. In Foucha, Louisiana had established
Moreover, some of the qualifying crimes may not involve any physical force. WASH.
REV. CODE § 71.09.020(4) (Supp. 1990-91).
20. See supra note 13.
21. See Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1791-97 (J. Kennedy, dissenting).
22. Though the Supreme Court has upheld preventive detention of individuals
considered dangerous who had not committed a crime (see supra note 11), the
Washington statute must be analyzed under Salerno and Foucha because it involves
confinement of individuals as dangerous who have committed a crime in the past.
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that Foucha had committed a criminal act in the past and, most
probably, had acted with the requisite criminal mind.
Opponents of the statute characterize the Washington law
as an illegitimate exercise of preventive detention because,
though in form a civil commitment statute, the purpose and
effect of the law is to confine indefinitely individuals who are
not mentally ill or disordered solely because they are considered at risk of reoffending.2 s The commission of a single crime
(which could have occurred at any time in the past) required
by the Washington law is no greater a justification for
obtaining a defendant's confinement than was the grand jury's
indictment in Salerno2 4 or the verdict of not guilty by reason
of insanity in Foucha.25 Despite Professor Brooks's argument
to the contrary, the Washington law cannot be sustained under
either Salerno or Foucha as a lawful exercise of the state's
power of preventive detention.
B.

Involuntary Civil Commitment

Civil commitment based on the state's police power to prevent harm to the individual or to the community requires the
government to prove that an individual suffers from some
form of mental disorder that causes him to be dangerous to
himself or others. 26 Because such commitments seek to prevent future harm, which may include criminal acts, they do
have aspects of "preventive detention" as Professor Brooks
correctly notes.27 Such commitment schemes have generally
been upheld against constitutional challenge.'
But it is essential to understand that this special system of
social care and control is only applicable to the mentally disabled. Only if an individual suffers from a mental illness or is
developmentally disabled and this condition causes him to be
dangerous can the state secure indeterminate commitment of
an individual. Without each of these conditions being satisfied-mental illness or retardation that causes dangerous
behavior-the state is not authorized under our constitutional
23. See ACLU Brief, supra note 7.
24. Salerno v. United States, 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
25. Foucha v. Louisiana, 112 S. Ct. 1780 (1992).
26. Developments in the Law-Civil Commitment of the Mentally 171, 87 HARV. L.
REV. 1190 (1974); John Q. La Fond, An Examination of the Purposes of Involuntary
Civil Commitment, 30 BuFFALO L. REV. 499 (1981).
27. Brooks, supra note 3, at 717.
28. See supra note 26.
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system to confine someone indefinitely to prevent him from
harming himself or others.
There is no serious dispute about the constitutional validity of involuntary civil commitment under the state's police
power. There is, however, a serious disagreement as to
whether the Washington statute is a bona fide system of civil
commitment. Opponents argue that the law does not require
proof of mental illness as Foucha requires.29 Indeed, the Washington law only requires proof of a "personality disorder" or
"mental abnormality" that "makes a person likely to engage in
predatory acts of sexual violence" against "strangers or persons
with whom a relationship was established for purposes of
victimization."'3
In Foucha, the Supreme Court specifically held that
neither a "personality disorder" nor an "anti-social personality" (generally considered by mental health professions as a
subcategory of "personality disorder") 31 constitutes a mental
illness that would justify involuntary civil commitment either
for a person found not guilty by reason of insanity or for a prisoner nearing the end of his prison term.32 The Court's holding
makes especially good sense because it is quite easy to qualify
as suffering from a personality disorder.3
Despite the clear mandate of Foucha, Professor Brooks
nonetheless seems to assert that "personality disorder,"
because it is defined as a mental illness in the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-III-R)4 (though
it is not considered a form of illness that is suffered specifically
by sex offenders or that causes sex offenders to commit sexual
crimes3 5 ) is legally and constitutionally sufficient to sustain
29. Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1786.
30. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.010 (Supp. 1990-91).
31. See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS, DSM-III-R 342 (3d ed. rev. 1987) [hereinafter DSM-III-R].
32. Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1784-85.
33. Someone who is at least eighteen years of age and, before the age of fifteen,
was often truant, often initiated physical fights, and often lied and who has, since 15,
been unable to sustain consistent work, fails to honor financial obligations, and has no
regard for the truth, could be diagnosed as having an anti-social personality disorder,
which is a type of "personality disorder." DSM-III-R, supra note 31, at 344-45.
34. Id

This manual is the authoritative compilation of mental disorders officially

recognized by the American Psychiatric Association. It provides a comprehensive
description of symptoms for each recognized mental disorder and a systematic method
for diagnosing these disorders.
35. As Professor Brooks himself points out, the DSM-III-R does not include rape,
even repetitive rape, as a personality disorder. Brooks, supra note 3, at 731-32.
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involuntary civil commitment.'
Professor Brooks dismisses
the relevance and applicability of Foucha by concluding that
the Supreme Court simply relied on the opinion of a single
hospital doctor that personality disorder was not a mental illness. 37 Such a reading of Foucha ignores the categorical conclusion set forth in the majority's opinion that "personality
disorder" and "anti-social personality" do not constitute mental
illness and ignores the Court's clear warning against using
such waste-basket labels to justify indefinite confinement. s
Indeed, if Professor Brooks is correct, all the state must do to
continue Foucha's indefinite confinement is to have a different
doctor testify that he considers a "personality disorder" to be a
mental illness. Surely, the Court's clear delineations of the
limits imposed by the substantive Due Process Clause of the
United States Constitution on the state's power of civil commitment could not rest on such a fragile factual predicate.
Professor Brooks uses the DSM-III-R selectively and
inconsistently. Because "personality disorder" is listed (albeit
cautiously) in the DSM-III-R, it must, he says, qualify as a
mental illness that can validate civil commitment. Conveniently, however, just because "mental abnormality" is not
listed as a mental illness in the same authoritative text, that,
he says, does not render it unfit to qualify as a mental illness
as required by Foucha. Professor Brooks says:
The "mental abnormality" language is not intended to be a
psychiatric term. The fact that it is not listed as such in the
DSM-III-R is irrelevant. It is a legal term, intended to convey a form of pathology that leads to violent sexual
9
3

offenses.

Foucha's limit on the civil commitment power of the state
surely cannot be so easily circumvented by a legislature's decision to create "legal" mental illnesses out of whole cloth. If
Professor Brooks is correct and the legislature can simply
declare "pathology"40 without any scientific or medical basis,
perhaps, Humpty Dumpty was correct when he said to Alice:
36. Id. at 733.
37. Id. at 728.
38. See Foucha v. Louisiana, 112 S. Ct. 1780, 1787 (1992).
39. Brooks, supra note 3, at 730.
40. WEBSTER'S DELUXE UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 1313-14 (2d ed. 1983) describes
"pathology" as: "1. that part of medicine that deals with the nature of diseases, their
causes and symptoms, and especially the structural and functional changes caused by
disease; 2. all the processes, results, or conditions produced by a particular disease."
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"When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, "it means just what I choose it to mean-neither
more nor less.""'
Professor Brooks argues that:

"...the

question is not

whether the term [mental abnormality] is a common psychiatric term, but whether the term would be applied fairly."4 2
Conveniently, he never does say what he means by "fairly."
Surely Professor Brooks must mean that the term provides a
reasonably accurate description of a mental disorder and that
the term has both reliability and validity. "Reliability" in this
context refers to whether mental health professionals would
generally agree among themselves with the same diagnosis
when observing the same symptoms in the same individual.
"Validity" in this context means that the term ("mental abnormality") accurately describes symptoms which the patient
actually manifests in the real world.4 3 Without a firm mooring
in mental health expertise and without a uniform and verifiable system of symptoms, diagnosis, and treatment, the legislature's creation of "pathology" renders illusory any hope that
its definitional concoction has any significant "reliability" or
"validity." Thus, there is virtually no hope that the term can
be applied fairly and consistently in the legal system. What
should this "legal" term mean to clinicians and how should
they apply it? What are its etiology, symptoms, prognosis, and
treatment? How can clinicians apply this term with any uniformity over many cases? How should a defense attorney
cross-examine a mental health professional about this purported "legal diagnosis"? Professor Brooks actually suggests a
definition of "mental abnormality" that is substantially different from the statute's own definition of this very same term. 44
41. LEWIS CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS, in
ANNOTATED ALICE 269 (1960).

MARTIN GARDNER, THE

42. Brooks, supra note 3, at 730.
43. For a good description of "reliability" and "validity," see Bruce J. Ennis &
Thomas R. Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise: Flipping Coins in
the Courtroom, 62 CAL. L. REV. 693, 699-711 (1974).
44. The statute defines the term as follows:
"Mental abnormality" means a congenital or acquired condition affecting
the emotional or volitional capacity which predisposes the person to the
commission of criminal sexual acts in a degree constituting such person to be
a menace to the health and safety of others.
WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.020(2) (Supp. 1990-91). Professor Brooks defines mental
abnormality as "some form of mental condition, or pathology that impairs volitional
controls and causes them to behave in the compulsive, repetitive, irrational, and selfdestructive ways that are typical of mental disorders." Brooks, supra note 3, at 730.
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In so doing, he has in a wonderfully graphic manner confirmed
the fundamental flaw in the statute's use of this term, which
was noted by the Washington Psychiatric Association. Each
mental health professional will necessarily generate his or her
own operative definition. How can such a squishy term possibly be applied "fairly"?
Even assuming that either "personality disorder" or
"mental abnormality" does set forth a form of mental illness
or disorder, there is no recognized mental illness or disorder
that causes an individual to seek out strangers or to establish a
relationship with individuals for the purpose of sexual victimization. In conjuring up such an idiosyncratic definition of
mental disorder, the legislature has gone beyond the bounds of
any behavioral dysfunction recognized by mental health professionals and created a hopeless muddle.
More disturbing, Professor Brooks seems to applaud the
legislature's attempt to "convey a form of pathology that leads
to violent sexual offenses"4 5 even though it does not provide a
definition that has any basis in mental health expertise or that
can be applied fairly and consistently by mental health experts
within the law's adjudicatory system. Though Professor
Brooks seemingly relies on recidivism as the core symptom of
his definition of pathology, the legislature does not. Rather,
the Washington statute deduces the existence of a causative
mental illness from the commission of a single qualifying sex
crime against qualifying victims. In short, "pathology" can be
coextensive with the commission of a single sex crime. This
definitional strategy is a pure tautology, conflating both diagnosis and prediction with a single incident of criminal behavior. It is circular reasoning at its worst! This so called
pathology is neither medicine nor science; it is legislative
legerdemain.
Professor Brooks seemingly does not require the presence
of a medically recognized mental illness or disorder that causes
an individual to be dangerous before he would permit involuntary civil commitment. Rather, some specious form of "pathology" undefined and undiagnosable is sufficient. This is
certainly not the teaching of any civil commitment case cited
in his article nor is it the teaching of Foucha. Unless legislatures have a clear and accurate conception of involuntary civil
45. Brooks, supra note 3, at 730.
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commitment and its limits, they can easily misapply or abuse
this system of social care and control.
Even if by some incredible stretch of the imagination, the
statute does describe a medically meaningful model of mental
illness that causes someone to be dangerous and in need of
treatment, it is difficult to imagine why the state requires that
diagnosis and treatment be deferred so long after the purported mental illness has manifested itself through a sexual
crime. 4 No other commitment law in America imposes such a
delayed-fuse restriction on diagnosis and treatment.
Professor Brooks cites Baxstrom v. Herold47 to justify
committing prisoners to mental health facilities following the
expiration of their prison term.4" What he does not mention,
however, is that Baxstrom held that the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires the state to use
the same commitment standards and procedures to commit
prisoners nearing the end of their prison terms as are used to
commit all other citizens whom the state considers mentally ill
or disabled and dangerous. 49 The Court in Baxstrom specifically held that a state could not use a different commitment
scheme for these convicted criminals because the fact of a prior
conviction is simply not relevant to a determination of mental
illness or present dangerousness.
The plurality opinion in Foucha v. Louisiana reaffirmed
the equal protection analysis of Baxstrom.5 ° Thus, the Washington statute should be struck down under Baxstrom and
Foucha because it uses commitment and release standards and
procedures substantially more disadvantageous to prospective
committees than those provided by the state's Involuntary
Treatment Act. 5 The government can commit mentally ill
prisoners who are nearing the end of their prison terms or
46. For a more thorough analysis of this point, see La Fond, supra note 11, at 69596.
47. 383 U.S. 107 (1966).
48. He also asserts, without explanation or authority, that a "significant part of
the population of most maximum security mental hospitals consist of patients who
have been committed there following completion of their prison terms." Brooks,
supra note 3, at 717. This is certainly not the case in Washington state where most
dangerous patients are civilly committed to the state's mental health facilities.
49. Baxstrom, 383 U.S. at 114-15.
50. Foucha v. Louisiana, 112 S. Ct. 1780, 1788-89 (1992).
51. WASH. REv. CODE ch. 71.05 (1989). For an analysis of this statute, see Mary L.
Durham & John Q. La Fond, The Empirical Consequences and Policy Implications of
Broadening the Statutory Criteriafor Involuntary Civil Commitment, 3 YALE L. &
POL'Y REV. 395 (1985).

University of Puget Sound Law Review

766

[Vol. 15:755

have been released into the community but only if it uses the
general involuntary civil commitment statute. It cannot create
a special system of commitment that treats an arbitrarily
selected class much more harshly than any other citizen who is
entitled to his liberty.
Professor Brooks also concludes that treatment effectiveness is not required by the Constitution. 52 He presents the
facts and holdings of Youngberg v. Romeo 53 and Allen v. Illinois5 without much analysis or application of these cases to
the Washington statute. He then simply concludes that'5 "it is
unlikely the Court will [require efficacious treatment].
In Youngberg v. Romeo,' the Supreme Court held that a
developmentally disabled person confined in a state institution
has a constitutional right to safe conditions of confinement and
freedom from bodily restraint as well as such minimally adequate training as required by these interests. Youngberg has
minimal applicability to this case because, as Professor Brooks
himself notes, Romeo did not seek to enforce a right to treatment. Romeo simply sought such ancillary treatment as would
secure for him his constitutional rights to safety and bodily
freedom. As Professor Brooks correctly observes, this case can
shed no light on whether the Constitution requires effective
treatment. Moreover, it was apparent to everyone that
Nicholas Romeo was going to spend the rest of his life in a
state institution; although Nicholas was thirty-three years old
chronologically, he had an IQ equivalent to an eighteen-monthold child. Even then, the Court held Romeo did have a limited
right to treatment.
Allen is more to the point. Though the appellant in Allen
did not claim a right to treatment, the Court's holding is
instructive, nonetheless. In Allen, the Court characterized the
Illinois commitment scheme for sexually dangerous offenders
as civil rather than criminal. Under the Illinois law, the prosecutor had to choose between either conviction and punishment
or commitment and treatment. As Justice Rehnquist declared:
"In short, the State has disavowed any interest in punishment,
[has] provided for the treatment of those it commits, and [has]
established a system under which committed persons may be
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Brooks, supra note 3, at 733-35.
457 U.S. 307 (1982).
478 U.S. 364 (1986).
Brooks, supra note 3, at 735.
457 U.S. 307 (1982).
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released after the briefest time in conflnement."' 7 Thus, Allen
strongly suggests that bona fide treatment as an alternative to
conviction and punishment is a constitutionally required purpose of sexual offender commitment statutes. In sharp contrast, the Washington law requires the state to fully punish an
offender before permitting indefinite commitment, thereby
ensuring extended confinement rather than release in the
"briefest time."
Foucha is also revealing. Whether or not a condition was
treatable was very important to the majority in determining
whether a condition should be considered mental illness. Justice White said:
Here, in contrast, the State asserts that because Foucha once
committed a criminal act and now has an antisocialpersonality that sometimes leads to aggressive conduct, a disorder
for which there is no effective treatment, he may be held
indefinitely. This rationale would permit the State to hold
indefinitely any other insanity acquittee not mentally ill who
could be shown to have a personality disorder that may lead
to criminal conduct. The same would be true of any convicted criminal, even though he has completed his prison
term. It would also be only a step away from substituting
confinements for dangerousness for our present system
which, with only narrow exceptions and aside from permissible confinements for mental illness, incarcerates only those
who are proved beyond reasonable doubt to have violated a
5
criminal law. 8

After all, mental illness assumes there is a causative defect in
cognitive, emotional, or volitional processes that can be diagnosed and, in most cases, treated. It is certainly more than the
commission of a single criminal offense.
Allen also made it clear that the state cannot hide behind a
"commitment" system that was really a sham for extended
incarceration. Such a system, whether dubbed civil or criminal, would be struck down. As Justice Rehnquist said in Allen,
if the statutory scheme is "'so punitive either in purpose or
effect as to negate [the State's] intentions' that the proceeding
be considered civil, it must be considered criminal .

.

. ."'

A

good case can be made that the Washington scheme is just such
57. Allen, 478 U.S. at 370 (emphasis added).
58. Foucha v. Louisiana, 112 S. Ct. 1780, 1787 (1992) (emphasis added).
59. Allen, 478 U.S. at 369.
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a sham. It does not require the presence of mental illness that
causes an individual to be dangerous as required by Foucha.
The law also precludes commitment and treatment until the
state has exacted its full measure of punishment even though
the evidence of alleged mental illness, dangerousness, and the
need for treatment was almost always available to the government long before commitment was sought. ° In reality, the
Washington law is lifetime preventive detention masquerading
as involuntary psychiatric treatment.
As disturbing is Professor Brooks's use of precedent to
support his conclusion that it really does not matter if effective
treatment is unavailable for these offenders. As he puts it:
But it must be recognized that the goal of the SVP statute is not primarily treatment. The statute is designed to
confine an extremely limited number of dangerous and mentally abnormal persons because they are too dangerous to be
at large ....

6

Surely, a state statute that creates a fictional class of mentally
abnormal offenders unknown to the mental health professions,
declares them to be dangerous and virtually untreatable, and
conveniently extends their incarceration beyond their lawful
term of imprisonment until they are "cured"-by definition an
impossibility-must be considered as preventive detention and
not civil commitment of the mentally disordered for care and
control.
C. Criminal Punishment
Professor Brooks also seems to conclude that, because
either an extended determinate sentence or an indeterminate
sentence could have been imposed upon conviction for the
defendant's past crime, there is no substantial difficulty, constitutional or moral, in simply extending an offender's incarceration beyond his lawful criminal sentence if he is considered
still dangerous. In his view, a prediction of dangerousness is
built into an extended or indeterminate sentence, thus validating indefinite confinement that is not imposed as punishment
for a past criminal act. 2
Of course the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the United States
60. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.030 (Supp. 1990-91).
61. Brooks, supra note 3, at 735.
62. Brooks, supra note 3, at 718-19.
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and Washington Constitutions forbid extending prison terms
after conviction regardless of the public policy to be served.6 3
The principle of legality insists that both the crime and punishment be fixed in advance and that an individual have notice of
the punishment. This fundamental principle of American
jurisprudence protects all citizens from an oppressive and dictatorial government. Indeed, it is a vital element in the rule of
law which distinguishes our democracy from police states.
Aside from constitutional considerations, the primary purpose of extended sentences for repeat offenders under Washington's Sentencing Reform Act is to punish the greater
culpability of a multiple offender, not to confine him or her
longer because of dangerousness. Indeed, Washington state no
longer tries to predict dangerousness as an element of an
offender's release from prison precisely because the legislature
did not think it could be done accurately.'
More importantly, a criminal can avoid any indeterminate
sentencing scheme by not offending. The Washington law,
however, does not provide any once-convicted offender with
such a logical and humane opportunity. To the contrary, a single qualifying sex crime committed in any state at any time in
one's life against qualifying victims continues to subject an
individual to commitment under the law until he or she dies.
In short, there is nothing an individual can do to avoid lifetime
commitment under the statute. The statute does not require
multiple offenses as a condition of indeterminate commitment.
A single crime legally suffices. Thus, any prediction of dangerousness required by the statute is of extremely dubious value
because it can legally be based on such scant and stale behavioral evidence.
Finally, the Washington law is extraordinarily sweeping in
scope. Literally, thousands of once-convicted sex offenders
qualify for commitment under the literal language of the law,
including those who are simply visiting the state. Without guidance of any kind, the law effectively delegates to the executive branch carte blanche discretion to decide which
individuals shall be confined under the law's expansive net.
Professor Brooks does not address this issue. Rather, he
63. See Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37 (1990); Addleman v. Board of Prison
Terms & Paroles, 107 Wash. 2d 503, 730 P.2d 1327 (1986); Foucha v. Louisiana, 112 S.
Ct. 1780, 1807 n.16 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
64. See generally DAVID BOERNER, SENTENCING IN WASHINGTON (1985) and the
Sentencing Reform Act, WASH. REV. CODE ch. 9.94A (1989 & Supp. 1990, 1990-91).
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argues that prosecutors will use the law sparingly and that: "It
results in the confinement of a very small cohort of offenders."6 5 There is no empirical basis for this conclusion. Because
few, if any, new commitment petitions have been filed during
the period in which the Washington Supreme Court is reviewing the constitutionality of the statute, it appears that prosecutors have informally decided to hold additional filings under
the law in abeyance until its constitutionality has been decided.
If the law is upheld, it is reasonable to expect that prosecutors
will file many more commitment petitions.
II.

THE PREDICTION OF DANGEROUSNESS

No party, including the American Civil Liberties Union of
Washington, has ever argued in the litigation challenging the
constitutionality of the Washington law that the Constitution
proscribes using dangerousness as a criterion in involuntary
civil commitment or preventive detention. As Professor
Brooks correctly notes, the United States Supreme Court has
permitted predictions of dangerousness as part of a capital sentencing proceeding" and in pretrial confinement of defendants
considered too dangerous to be released on bail pending trial."
Consequently, the Court is likely to permit the use of such predictions in civil commitment proceedings.68
But numerous courts, including the Washington Supreme
Court, recognizing that accurate predictions of dangerousness
are extremely difficult to make, require the government to
adduce evidence of recent, overt acts demonstrating that the
defendant is presently dangerous.6 9 Without such evidence,
the probability of an incorrect prediction is extremely high. To
support his contrary position, Professor Brooks cites one case,
Mathew v. Nelson,70 which did not require proof of an overt act
and ignores many other cases, including a Washington case,
which did require an overt act.7 1 The Mathew case, of course,
65. Brooks, supra note 3, at 754.
66. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983).
67. Salerno v. United States, 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
68. See Laura K. Haddad, Predicting the Supreme Court's Response to the
Criticism of Psychiatric Predictions of Dangerousness in Civil Commitment
Proceedings,64 NEB. L. REV. 215 (1985).
69. In re Harris, 98 Wash. 2d 276, 654 P.2d 109 (1982); Reed Groethe, Comment,
Overt Dangerous Behavior as a Constitutional Requirement for Involuntary Civil
Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 562 (1977).
70. 461 F. Supp. 707 (N.D.Ill. 1978).
71. See supra note 69 and cases cited therein.
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involved a short-term prediction of dangerousness as required
under the state's general involuntary commitment law. It did
not involve a long-term prediction of dangerousness like that
required by the Washington law. Psychiatrists have much
greater confidence in their ability to make short-term predictions of dangerousness than long-term predictions.7 2
Professor Brooks also argues that the state would be
unable to provide recent evidence of dangerousness because
most targets of the law would be in prison where they cannot
engage in conduct manifesting dangerousness. This is simply
not the case. Prisoners serving prison terms can act in violent
or sexually explicit ways while in confinement. In addition,
the case of Earl Shriner, which inspired this law,7" involved an
individual who did provide evidence of his dangerousness while
in prison. And Professor Boerner, who participated in drafting
the law, asserted that, without evidence of diaries, drawings, or
statements by someone presently serving a prison term, the
state would probably not succeed in obtaining commitment.7 4
Thus, the author of the law considered such evidence to be reasonably available and necessary for commitment.
The more salient point, however, is that the Washington
law does not require any evaluation of the individual's recent
or current behavior in predicting dangerousness. It does not,
for example, require any evidence of planning sex crimes, sexually violent fantasies, or deteriorating mental condition. In
short, it does not require any tangible proof concerning the
individual's recent behavior or mental condition upon which a
mental health expert might base either a current diagnosis or a
prediction. In most cases tried so far, the government has
relied on evidence which predates the individual's last convic72. See the Amicus Curiae Brief for the American Psychiatric Association,
Barefoot v. Estelle, 483 U.S. 880 (1983) (No. 82-6080).
73. See David Boerner, Confronting Violence: In the Act and In the Word, 15 U.
PUGET SOUND L. REV. 525 (1992).

74. In testifying before the legislature, Professor Boerner said:
What we [on the Task Force] had in mind was the case like Shriner where
you had direct physical evidence of plans to commit future crimes, diaries,

notes, and those sorts of things. I think absent that... psychiatric prediction
plus the crime years ago isn't going to be enough to satisfy a jury under the
standards we've provided.
See ACLU Brief, supra note 7, at Appendix D (containing excerpts from pages six and
seven of transcript compiled from a tape recording of Professor David Boerner's testimony before the Senate Law and Justice Committee on Jan. 11, 1990).
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tion and sentencing. Using such stale evidence virtually
ensures inaccurate predictions of dangerousness.
Professor Brooks attempts to undermine the rather broadbased and consistent evidence that mental health professionals
are not capable of making accurate long-term predictions of
dangerousness by critiquing the methodologies used in selected
studies.
Probably the most famous of the studies critiquing the
ability of mental health professionals ability to accurately predict dangerousness are the Baxstrom studies conducted by
Henry Steadnan and his colleagues.75 Steadman and others
studied what happened to almost 1000 patients held in psychiatric hospitals for the criminally insane in New York state
when, after the Supreme Court ordered New York either to
commit them under the state's general commitment law or to

release them, 6 the state decided to release them. Though considered dangerous, all but a small number lived safely in the
community after their release.
Professor Brooks criticizes the Baxstrom studies because
the average age of these patients was forty-seven and their
decreased violence after release may have resulted from
advanced age. Yet, the Washington statute does not limit commitment by age. Douglas Aikens, the first individual against
whom a commitment petition was filed, was sixty-nine years
old at the time.7 7 Andre Brigham Young, the third person
committed under the law, was fifty at the time of his commitment. If Professor Brooks is correct, then a good case can be
made that, so far, prosecuting authorities are abusing the law
by seeking the commitment of older offenders who are less
likely to be violent. At the very least, there is simply no way
of knowing the average age of the cohort whose commitment
will be sought under the law.
Professor Brooks also is skeptical of the Baxstrom studies
because continued institutionalization itself may explain why
75. See, e.g., Robert C. Hunt & E. David Wiley, Operation Baxstrom After One
Year, 124 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 974 (1968); Henry J. Steadman & Gary Keveles, The
Community Adjustment and Criminal Activity of the Baxtrom Patients: 1966-70, 129

AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 309 (1972).
76. See supra notes 47-51 and accompanying
protection analysis in Baxstrom].

text

[Discussion of the equal

77. State v. Douglas Aikens, No. 90-2-02436-2 (Clark County filed Aug. 16, 1990).
See also Debera Carlton Harrell, First Sex PredatorPetition Is Filed, SEATTLE POSTINTELLIGENCER, Aug. 18, 1990, at B-1. He was also a first time offender.

1992]

A Response to ProfessorBrooks

so many Baxstrom patients did not commit acts of violence.78
This may be true. But the same can be said for most of the
individuals who are likely to be committed under the Washington law. Most of them will have served time in prison. If prosecutors ignore the law and limit commitment to individuals
who have a "pattern" of criminal activity, their time spent in
prison should be even longer. In any event, the Washington
law selects out as prospective targets those who, like many of
the Baxstrom subjects, will have spent significant time in institutions just before their confinement is sought under the law.
If prolonged institutionalization impaired accurate predictions
of dangerousness for Baxstrom patients as Professor Brooks
asserts, it will also impair accurate predictions of dangerousness under the Washington law.
Professor Brooks criticizes a study by Kozol and his colleagues on the prediction of dangerousness because it excluded
samples; that is, it did not take into account fifty-seven individuals whom mental health professionals had predicted to be
dangerous and whom judges, agreeing with such predictions,
committed as dangerous.7 9 Would those individuals have committed dangerous acts if released? We simply don't know nor
can we ever know. Nonetheless, Professor Brooks is willing to
"speculate as to how those men would have behaved if discharged."'
He assumes that, if thirty-seven of these fiftyseven individuals-sixty-five percent of the excluded samplewould have committed dangerous acts if released, then predictions of accuracy would have reached almost fifty percent; i.e.,
one out of two. By simply assuming a hypothetical accuracy
rate of sixty-five percent in the excluded sample (which is a
figure with absolutely no empirical basis whatsoever and which
also assumes an extremely favorable answer to the very question at issue), Professor Brooks has managed by a deft sleightof-hand to rehabilitate the predictive expertise of mental
health professionals to the same level that could be achieved
by flipping a coin!8' That is, it is no better than chance.
Professor Brooks also criticizes studies on the prediction of
78. Professor Brooks notes: "Finally, the mean length of continuous
institutionalization for members of the Baxstrom cohort was almost fifteen years,
another significant factor leading to reduced subsequent violent behavior." Brooks,
supra note 3, at 741-42.
79. Id. at 743-44.
80. Id.
81. Ennis & Litwack, supra note 43, at 693.
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dangerousness because they use inadequate outcome measures
and underreport criminal behavior. There is undoubtedly
some truth to these criticisms. But, at best, these criticisms
only suggest that mental health professionals' predictions of
long-term dangerousness may not be as woefully inaccurate as
previously thought. Professor Boerner, the author of the
Washington law, disagrees with Professor Brooks. He claims
that:
All available evidence indicates that our ability to predict
the occurrence of future criminal behavior is appallingly
poor. When attempts are made to predict future violent
crime, the subject of most concern, the results are even
worse. The predictive techniques are accurate in no more

than one-third of the cases and many studies
have been
82
wrong eighty to ninety percent of the time.
Though Kozol's studies and the other studies Professor
Brooks criticizes did have inherent design limitations that may
have prevented the researchers from obtaining results with the
highest degree of accuracy and generalizability, it is important
to remember that these studies, nonetheless, do provide
extremely useful and accurate information. Though not without limitations, the research demonstrated consistently that
mental health professionals were extremely inaccurate in predicting dangerous behavior.
The current state of the art can be summarized simply.
No well-designed studies affirmatively establish that mental
health professionals make accurate predictions of dangerousness in more than two out of five cases.8 3 Even this forty percent success rate is, of course, still less accurate than flipping a
coin.
Professor Brooks also asserts that, according to some
researchers, a number of sex offenders commit a large number
of crimes. Others claim that there are far more sex crimes
committed than reported. All of this may or may not be true. 4
We simply cannot know. But, as we shall see shortly, these
82. BOERNER, supra note 64, at 2-17.
83. Robert J. Menzies et al., Hitting the Forensic Sound Barrier:Predictions of
Dangerousnessin a PretrialPsychiatricClinic, in DANGEROUSNESS: PROBABILITY AND
PREDICTION: PSYCHIATRY AND PUBLIC POLICY (Christopher Webster et al. eds., 1985).
84. It should be noted that "completed paraphiliac acts" can consist of relatively
minor incidents, such as placing a hand on a minor's shoulder for sexual gratification.
The unsophisticated reader might otherwise assume that all such acts consist of violent
or even sexually explicit behavior.
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assertions, even if true, would not furnish any empirical support for the law.
To establish his claim that some sex offenders are responsible for a large number of crimes, Professor Brooks cites a
"study" reported in the Reader'sDigest, a popular magazine. In
this study, one psychologist interviewed eight offenders to
ascertain their criminal history. Of course, no serious social
scientist would conclude anything of substance from a nonrandom sample of eight individuals. Even more bizarre, these
eight individuals allegedly self-reported committing "13,000
deviant acts" 5 which, though undefined in the article, include
"molestation and rape." 8 If believed, these figures indicate
that each of them committed a "deviant act" almost five times
a day for a year or one such act almost every day for five years.
One is tempted to conclude that either a vast majority of these
"deviant acts" must have been extremely minor or the subjects
must have had active imaginations. More to the point, the use
of such a poorly designed and unreliable "study" that is so
vague in recounting its "findings" can only inflame public passion; it cannot inform public policy.
But, even if it is true that sex crimes (like most other
crimes) are underreported and that some sex offenders commit
many sex crimes, these broad-brush claims do not establish
that mental health professionals can accurately identify which,
if any, offender will commit serious sex crimes. Nor do they
establish that these sex offenders suffered from a mental illness that caused their behavior. In short, these assertions
throw more heat than light on the subject. To less sophisticated readers, these assertions, many of them woefully speculative and unsubstantiated, will simply stir up anger and a desire
for revenge, while provoking lawmakers to take draconian
action. They do not establish that the Washington law rests on
sound social science or medical knowledge.
There may be, as Professor Brooks asserts,8 7 a small
number of notorious criminals who commit serious serial sex
crimes. Individuals such as Jeffrey Dahmer and Ted Bundy
come to mind. But in almost every such case, it was only after
their arrest that we knew who these offenders were. In most
of these cases the defendants were sentenced to death or life
85. Brooks, supra note 3, at 745.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 746-47.
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imprisonment. If anything, these cases also demonstrate that
we really cannot identify such dangerous offenders prospectively. Thus, the Washington law will be of no practical use.
Citing exceptional cases, while stirring public fear, does not
establish that experts can identify in advance who these "very
rare" violent offenders are.'
Professor Brooks also criticizes researchers and commentators for not keeping their cohorts straight. That is, they use
studies on one group of subjects to generate information that
they then claim is relevant to a much different group. For
example, studies on schizophrenics may not be useful for generating useful knowledge about individuals who suffer from
affective or mood disorders. (It should be remembered that
the Kozol study discussed earlier, which demonstrated that
mental health experts could not accurately predict recidivism
among a group of violent sex offenders, did examine the same
general cohort as that targetted by the Washington law.) This
is a salutary caution. But Professor Brooks then commits the
same error many times over. For example, he reports one
study by Abel that indicates a high rate of reoffense for
unspecified "completed paraphiliac acts" of pedophilia-again,
undefined. 9 But so far, every individual committed under the
Washington law has been convicted of rape, not pedophilia.
Thus, studies on pedophiliacs can not be generalized to rapists.
Professor Brooks makes a series of empirical assertionsunencumbered by any citation to authority of any kind-that
boggle the mind. He says, for example: "Unlike many other
mentally disordered persons, violent sex offenders are compulsive in their need to commit offenses that provide them with
gratification. Many pedophiles, for example, are notoriously
unable to change. Statistics indicate they act out obsessively,
and often in situations that put them at great risk."'
Professor Brooks seems to assert that all violent sex offenders are
mentally disordered. Surely, he cannot mean this. Are they
entitled to the defense of insanity or diminished capacity?
Upon what studies is he relying? Is modern law reform
(including the virtual abolition of sexual psychopath laws) that
rests on the assumption that sex offenders are not mentally ill
but rather are moral agents who are responsible for their
88. Id. at 747.
89. Id. at 745.
90. Id,at 748.
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actions wrong? 9 ' Are pedophiles unable or unwilling to
change their behavior? How can "statistics" establish that
pedophiles act out "obsessively" and "at great risk"? These
claims need support; yet, none is provided.
Even more disturbing is Professor Brooks's failure to point
to any study that examines individuals who "suffer from a personality disorder or mental abnormality" that makes them
likely to commit sex crimes against "strangers or individuals
with whom a relationship has been established or promoted for
the primary purpose of victimization.""2 Thus, in mentioning
with enthusiasm a number of studies that he claims supports
his view, Professor Brooks has committed the same cardinal
sin of misapplying findings from cohorts that are very different
from the cohort identified by the Washington law. None of
these studies generate useful or confirmatory knowledge as far
as this law is concerned.
Finally, Professor Brooks argues that "actuarial data" can
be used to predict dangerousness more accurately. Unfortunately, the only correlation he uses to conduct what purports
to be an actuarial approach is the number of past offenses. In
brief, he asserts that the more offenses an individual has committed, the more likely he is to commit a violent act in the
future. Besides mismatching cohorts once again - using generalizations based on all offenders to support claims about sex
offenders-Professor Brooks conveniently ignores the fact that
the Washington law only requires a single offense committed
at any time in an offender's past. Thus, the statute relies on an
actuarial table that consists of only one offense. Studies about
multiple offenders, as Professor Brooks has already demonstrated so forcefully, have no relevance to this law.
In conclusion, Professor Brooks has taken a quick march
through a few selected studies on the prediction of dangerousness and taken numerous but mostly harmless potshots at
them. In his march, he concludes that those studies that
undermine both the constitutionality and morality of the law
have fundamentally flawed research designs. On the other
hand, he concludes that those studies that lend some empirical
credence to the Washington law, including a study published in
Reader's Digest, have no methodological flaws and provide
91. See La Fond, supra note 11, at 663.
92. This is the essential scope of the Washington law.
§ 71.09.020 (Supp. 1990-91).
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sound empirical foundations. On other occasions, Professor
Brooks makes sweeping empirical generalizations about sex
offenders without benefit of any supporting studies. And, of
course, Professor Brooks has cited no study establishing that
mental health professionals can predict dangerousness with
sufficient accuracy to avoid confining large numbers of
nondangerous individuals to a psychiatric prison for possible
lifetime confinement.
Professor Brooks has also relied on a number of studies
that have extremely limited usefulness. Many of them are so
poorly designed so as to have extremely dubious validity and
reliability. Others studied cohorts that are essentially irrelevant to the group targeted by the Washington law; thus, they
cannot provide useful knowledge. Relying on these studies virtually guarantees that public policy will not rest on a sound
empirical basis but rather on inflamed public passion.
In the end, Professor Brooks comes to the ultimate value
judgement that it is better to lock up a group of individuals,
even though they have paid their debt to society and are entitled under the law to their freedom, if we are confident that up
to half of them will commit another sex crime at sometime in
the future. As between convicted sex offenders and possible
future victims, we should impose the "risk of error" on the
"guilty," not on "innocent" future victims. Though he
acknowledges that at least one out of every two persons (and
probably more) consigned to the gulag of a psychiatric prison
will not reoffend, these "mistakes are regrettable."
In Foucha, Justice White has condemned the use of "dangerousness" courts exactly like those Professor Brooks
embraces with such enthusiasm.9" If the Washington statute is
upheld, it will send the disturbing message to political action
groups that, if they capture the political process and insist on
heretofore unimagined techniques of crime control, the Constitution imposes no restraints on the power of the majority.
After all, constitutional limits on crime control are only questions of "interest balancing." Suddenly, the fundamental
assumption of American criminal justice that it "is far worse to
convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free"'9 4 has
been transformed into a first principle worthy of George
Orwell's 1984. Now, according to Professor Brooks, it is far
93. See Brooks, supra note 3, at 723-24.
94. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring.).
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better that at least half, and maybe more, of the people confined to a psychiatric prison indefinitely be harmless in order
to "incapacitate" those who may commit a future crime. Even
better, why not convert our criminal sentencing system into a
game of chance? Release from prison could be decided by a
flip of a coin. At least this lottery will be more accurate then
the one Professor Brooks embraces.

